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Abstract
Monique Roelofs’s The Cultural Promise of the Aesthetic is
groundbreaking in its nuanced account of the potential and
limitations of the aesthetic for creating a more just, humane
world.  Particularly timely are Roelofs’s analyses of the ways in
which racial and gender stereotypes are reinforced and the
operations of what she calls “racialized aesthetic nationalism,”
the tendencies of aesthetic values to shore up schisms along
racial, ethnic, and national lines.  I raise questions, however,
about the appropriateness of aesthetic criticism that stresses
sins of omission, the desirability of insisting that the broad
nexus of social relations always be kept in view, and the
danger that foregrounding minority group membership and
gender will reduce individuals in marked categories to mere
exemplifications of such status.
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1.  Introduction
Monique Roelofs’s The Cultural Promise of the Aesthetic sets a
new bar for accounts of the relation of aesthetics to politics.  It
demands that we move past naïve enthusiasms and
condemnations to recognition that the aesthetic has both
inherent possibilities and inevitable limitations.  It also insists
to all who are concerned about political justice and morality
that the aesthetic dimension of life must be taken seriously as
the basis on which transformations toward relational thriving
and more just arrangements must occur. 
The aesthetic is central, Roelofs argues, to our navigation of
interpersonal relationships and corporeal space, and this is the
basis for great expectations concerning its potential to benefit
culture.  However, celebration of its promise has historically
been bound up with unjustified discriminatory schemes that
have excluded certain people.  The Enlightenment model of
the individual subject engaged in disinterested contemplation
is too decontextualized and generic to deliver on its promise to
create a world of equality and mutual respect, and it ignores
the fact that aesthetic perceivers are never really disinterested
but instead are historically situated parties operating within a
concrete political world. 
Nevertheless, Roelofs sees real promise in the aesthetic,
though not because it offers a clear route to the ideal world. 
Its positive potential instead lies in its power to hold
incompatibles in tension with each other and make us aware of
the complicated ways we relate to each other and to our
world.  The promise, however, comes with risks and threats. 
Drawing certain things into visibility relegates others to the
background or occludes them, and aesthetic loves and
longings can motivate cruelties and new exclusions even as
they expand sensitivity in other ways.  Thus, we need to
remain vigilant, even when the aesthetic makes positive
contributions to our understanding of social reality.
2.  Aesthetic address
Central to Roelofs’s analysis is the idea of aesthetic address. 
She raises broad and important questions in this connection: 
To whom does a work appeal?  What aspects of self-
identification are reinforced or eclipsed by a work’s form of
address?  Whom does the form of address exclude?  How are
the specificities of inclusion and exclusion accomplished?  What
responses are elicited from the audience?  What does an
artwork implicitly promise, and what threats go hand in hand
with its promises?  How are relationships modeled and
negotiated by the work?  How do artworks promote political
affiliations, exclusions, and insights?
Recognizing that the value of the concept of aesthetic address
depends on its convincing application to specific cases, Roelofs
demonstrates its usefulness for interpreting cases across a
wide array of media. She presents illuminating case studies
that span poetry, film, literature, sculpture, painting, drawing,
television series, journalistic accounts, critical writing, and
architectural designs, along with everyday environments.  In
each instance, she considers ways in which the work or
phenomenon in question addresses the audience and
encourages relational perspectives on the larger context. 
3.  Race, gender, and the Enlightenment
Roelofs draws particular attention to ways in which the
aesthetic reinforces or challenges unjustified exclusions of
certain people from full moral, social, and political
consideration.  She theorizes what she calls “racialized
aesthetic nationalism,” the implicit tendencies of aesthetic
values to shore up a sense of “us” and “them” along racial,
ethnic, and national lines.[1]  She elaborates by itemizing
diverse ways in which aesthetic address can support a system
where one distinguishes one’s own group from others and
defends against their encroachment on what one takes as
one’s own.  A particularly forceful and focused illustration is
her discussion of a Dutch journalist’s column about a ride in an
Amsterdam taxicab driven by a presumably Arab immigrant. 
Roelofs shows how the writer utilizes numerous rhetorical
devices to enlist the reader’s support for his sense that his
rightful aesthetic home is threatened by the alien cabbie and
the atmosphere in his cab. 
Roelofs also extends feminist aesthetic discussion by showing
the ways that features of presentations masculinize, feminize,
or, most interestingly, do both in relation to an object, and
how these processes intersect and modify each other.  I
particularly commend her chapter on the gendered detail,
which offers extensive analysis  of  Johannes Vermeer’s
Mistress and Maid, and her account of Fernando Botero’s
representations of human bodies in the chapter on racialized
aesthetic nationalism.
Roelofs offers some surprises.  Most often, the contemporary
artists and theorists she criticizes come from the Left,
ostensibly the political segment from which one might expect
the greatest enthusiasm for her project.  For example, she
begins her analysis of the double-edged character of the
cultural promise of the aesthetic with a discussion of a work
by Chilean poet Pablo Neruda.  We might expect that Neruda
would represent the voices of those excluded from the
audience presupposed by traditional aesthetic culture. 
However, Roelofs quickly points out exclusions and absences
in Neruda’s own idealized view of the desirable cultural future. 
Indeed, she draws attention to his inconsistency in presenting
himself as a spokesperson for the common man while
simultaneously restricting the range of those he considers
possible allies and implicitly acquiescing in unacknowledged
social inequities. 
Similarly, in her chapter on the racialization of aesthetics, she
follows a discussion of the racist assumptions of Immanuel
Kant and Georg Hegel with a consideration of three figures
whose works represent something of a contrast:  Jamaica
Kincaid, Frantz Fanon, and Alice Varda.  However, in spite of
their obvious challenges to the views of the earlier
philosophers, Roelofs shows that these figures, too, share with
them certain problematic assumptions.  Roelofs seems to favor
a strategy for dealing with conceptual frameworks built on
binaries that derives from post-structuralism.  In this strategy,
the first move is to challenge the hierarchy set up by a
particular binary, and the second is to reverse the hierarchy. 
But this leaves the power of the binary in place along with any
pernicious consequences it may have.  The third,
quintessentially post-structuralist move is to displace the
entire system, and this is what Roelofs sees as necessary.  She
criticizes Kincaid, Fanon, and Varda for being content with
reversing binaries, leaving the Enlightenment’s scheme of rigid
oppositions in place.
Roelofs’s willingness to surprise agrees with what she takes to
be the most important contribution of the aesthetic.  The
aesthetic, in her view, is most promising when it startles us,
disrupting our habitual ways of seeing or drawing our attention
to something we have ignored.  Aesthetics is the dimension
where complexities become evident.  So when the aesthetic is
doing its proper work, our standing expectations, which
typically over-simplify, are likely to be thwarted.  Roelofs
attempts to do something similar with aesthetic theory. 
Roelofs’s big-stakes project is extremely timely, as it deals
with issues such as the affective substratum of racism and
issues of cultural ownership.  Her analysis of racialized
aesthetic nationalism is particularly relevant in the context of
the United States since the 9/11 terrorist attacks and, I
suspect, in that of Europe as it is being flooded with
immigrants.
4.  Criticizing sins of omission
Much as I admire this book, I have some questions about
Roelofs’s views on critical sins of omission and the demand for
political discernment.  To motivate my discussion of these
questions, I will focus on two instances where Roelofs criticizes
a particular theorist’s approach.  
The first case is Roland Barthes’s approach to photographs
within his influential work Camera Lucida.  Roelofs complains
that Barthes allows much to fall through the cracks in his
analysis of photographs in terms of the punctum, the detail
that emotionally touches the individual viewer, in opposition to
the studium, the more general human interest appeal of the
photograph, which viewers interpret it by making use of “a
classical body of information” about its subject matter.[2]
Barthes’s emphasizes the impact of the punctum, and Roelofs
takes issue with this.
In general, Roelofs is dubious of perspectives that emphasize
the individual spectator’s singular response, and this is one of
her grounds for criticizing Barthes’s emphasis on the punctum. 
I agree with her that focus on the individual spectator has
been excessive since the Enlightenment, and that social and
contextual features have often been ignored as a
consequence.  But is it appropriate to object to all accounts
that focus on the response of the aesthetic perceiver who
experiences in a singular way?  Is it fair to demand that the
entire web of social relationships be kept in view in every
aesthetic analysis?
It seems to me that even if it is valuable to recognize that
photographs can tell us much about social relationships and
alert us to our own relationships with what is depicted, this is
not the only legitimate way of reading a photograph.  The
photograph can facilitate the intimacy of one-on-one
connection, and this seems to be Barthes’s concern.  The
emotional climax of his book is his description of his personal
emotional response to seeing a photograph of his deceased
mother at the age of five and recognizing in it the same person
he knew in her adulthood.
Barthes’s interaction with the photo of his mother is not
outside of relationship, though it is not concerned with the
broader social nexus.  What he claims to see in the picture of
his mother is what made her the unique person she was. When
he looks for an image that really “is” his mother, he is seeking
a connection with her.  Attending to the photo is a relational
gesture.  Barthes's being bereaved and his awareness that his
mother to be no longer within the historical and social context
are among the factors that lead to this individual and
particular focus.  Barthes sees this particularity of response as
relevant to other encounters with photos, including those in
which social context seems more pertinent.  Roelofs rightly
observes that this is only one aspect of relating to a
photograph, but I don’t see it as an aspect that lacks value,
even if others are also important.
Let us consider another of Roelofs’s critiques.  She criticizes
Arthur Danto’s interpretation of the paintings and drawings of
Abu Ghraib by Columbian artist Fernando Botero on a number
of grounds, some of which I find problematic.  Danto agrees
with Roelofs that Botero’s Abu Ghraib works are powerful.  The
problem, as Roelofs sees it, lies in his explanation.  Danto
considers the power of the Abu Ghraib series to be based on
appeals to the viewer’s empathy.  This, according to Roelofs,
inappropriately restricts attention to the affective response of
the individual viewer.  Again, she finds the attention to
responses of “the viewer,” in the singular, to be insufficiently
appreciative of the co-presence of people and objects in the
physical world and the vulnerabilities that arise from this.  She
sees Botero’s work as drawing attention precisely to these
things through his figures’ “fleshy materiality.”[3]
Roelofs thinks Danto’s emphasis on the affective supplants
appropriate attention to the social and political dimension of
Botero’s art.  She admits that affect “can be a political
incentive” but claims that to focus attention on the viewer’s
affective response deprives the works of their potential
impact.[4]  Emphasis on the affective facilitates the viewers’
avoiding the realization of their own structural contribution to
injustice abroad.  
Although she acknowledges Danto’s closing line that, “the pain
of others has seldom felt so close, or so shaming to its
perpetrators,” Roelofs responds, “empathy and shame . . . fall
drastically short of an aesthetically discerning uptake of an
artistic imperative commanding justice . . .."[5]  Here, I think,
she short-changes the potential political power of emotion. 
Indeed, she reflects this when she characterizes viewers’
responses using  ‘affect’ and ‘feelings,’ words that suggest
vague and nebulous states, rather than ‘emotion,’ which
involves focus and direction toward specific objects.  The
emotion of shame, like all emotions, arouses action
tendencies.  In this case, it motivates the perceived need to
rectify the situation.  Moreover, I don’t think Danto restricts
his reference to shame to those who directly perpetrated the
prisoner abuse.  The implied accusation in his closing line is
directed at the perpetrators broadly considered; it implicates
all of us who are members of the nation with policies leading
to these acts.
Roelofs recognizes that ignoring certain things is essential to
aesthetic experience if only because interpretation requires
framing.  Yet she thinks some ignoring is culpable, as her
critique of Danto makes clear.  She criticizes him for not
linking the work by Botero that he admires (the paintings and
drawings of Abu Ghraib) with work that he does not (Botero’s
prior oeuvre).  Roelofs does a spectacular job of bringing out
grounds for interest in Botero’s depictions of human figures,
among them their implicit critique of reigning bodily norms and
their complicated intertextuality, which bring them into
conversation with artists across a long swath of international
art history.  She complains that Danto ignores Botero’s
relationship to the broader artistic tradition and relegates him
to outsider status, as is shown by his acquiescence in the
common characterization of the artist’s style as “mannerist”
and his failure to take his earlier work very seriously.[6] 
I don’t question that Danto is missing things concerning
Botero’s earlier work, and that his inattention to the complex
relationship that Botero has to the European tradition reflects
this, as does his largely Hegelian vision of art history that
implicitly takes “the art world” to be a Northern and Western
phenomenon.  But it may be unfair to expect a reassessment
of Botero’s overall output or an account of physical co-
presencing of humans and objects in relation to Botero’s art in
a relatively brief column in The Nation on a particular
exhibition.  Certainly, it seems more than a little uncharitable
to argue that Danto’s omissions render “the Abu Ghraib oeuvre
a proper item for consumption by a proprietary, racialized, and
nationalist cultural sensibility.”[7]
To make a more general point, I wonder when and under what
circumstances complaints about sins of omission are justified.
 I do not doubt that missing some things is a fault.  Recently,
while walking in an airport after a flight, I noticed that a pilot
ahead of me had a suitcase with words stitched on it.  “One
man,” said one line, “One woman,” said the next.  I briefly
thought, “Ah…a romantic!”  But my next thought was, “Wait!
 That’s not what that means!  The pilot’s a homophobe!”  My
only excuse for being so oblivious on that occasion is jet lag.
But there are many reasons for omitting considerations, and
many strike me as acceptable as long as one does not take
them to be the only way to see things.  After all, there are
inevitably trade-offs and framings.  Is it always illegitimate for
someone to focus on matters unrelated to political
inequalities?  Is it never appropriate to focus on form, for
example?
The point of accusing someone of omission is a rhetorical
move but a dangerous one, for it invites the “tu quoque”
response:  what are you ignoring?  So one might ask Roelofs
the following.  In spite of Botero’s merits that you itemize, isn’t
it still possible that his characteristic style does have
something of the gimmick about it?[8],[9]  Aren’t you ignoring
the fact that by acknowledging his earlier dismissal of Botero,
Danto accentuates how powerful he takes the Abu Ghraib work
to be?
Danto’s comparison of Botero’s figures to Macy’s parade
figures is comical, and it associates them with innocence,
making it all the more striking when he suggests that precisely
this quality of these figures intensifies our impression of
others’ pain in the Abu Ghraib works.[10]  And in light of the
fact that Danto is often quite critical of white American artists,
can it really be fair to suggest that he is critical of Botero’s
earlier works because he is Latin American, as Roelofs does
when she asserts, “It is highly unlikely that these seasoned
critics would have disregarded the self-conscious
intertextuality of an oeuvre so rapidly in the case of a white
artist of European or Anglo-American descent.”[11]
5.  Foregrounding race and gender
This leads me to another general question about the status of
aesthetic analysis that is not focused on politics.  As exciting
as what Roelofs elsewhere describes as “critical race feminist
aesthetics” is, should race and gender and their intersections
always be the focus within aesthetics?  I cherish the goals of
Roelofs’s project but I still think that the effect of consistently
foregrounding the social nexus might have unintended
consequences.
Questions about what should be foregrounded and when are
complicated.  I remember once seeing a rerun of a 1950s TV
show about doctors and being appalled that the person who
turned out to be guilty of the crime at the center of the drama
was played by the one person in the cast with an Asian face. 
My first thought was to think, “How racist!”  My next thought
was, “But should it be a principle that people from minority
groups are not to be cast as bad guys?”  Probably this should
be the rule in casts where only one person is a member of a
minority, a situation that may be objectionable in itself.  The
exclusion of the Asian actor as a candidate for the bad guy
role is probably more excusable than is the exclusion of all but
white male actors from playing ethical doctors.  But our goal
should be to make differences of race, ethnicity, and gender
less inflamed than they are now.  Perhaps we can dream of a
time when such status is not so marked as it is, and where
Asians can play roles of any sort without its seeming to be a
comment on being Asian.
True, this is not our social world.  But I see problems with
consistently making minority group status our primary focus, if
only because it tends to reduce members of these groups to
exemplifications of this status.  Ignoring it can lead to
shocking unfairness but dwelling on it can also keep barriers
intact.  A female graduate student in studio art once told me
that she didn’t know if she wanted to think of herself as a
“woman artist,” and I saw her point, even if it was obvious to
both of us that she will be regarded as a woman artist and
that this will affect her chances and opportunities for
professional success.  Roelofs is right that race and gender are
going to be factors in how works are presented and
interpreted, but it may be that having these structures in mind
at all times reinforces their importance. 
6.  Conclusion
Still, for the foreseeable future the importance of race and
gender in artworks is undeniable, and we overlook these
structures of inequity at the peril that they will be mindlessly
reiterated.  And that is what makes The Cultural Promise of
the Aesthetic such an important work.  It demonstrates how
the aesthetic and aesthetics, which we often tend to see as
inherently humanizing, can themselves insidiously undermine
the very values they appear to support.  The book is an
educating work that trains the reader through its astute
analyses of particular cases to probe deeply into the actual
effects of the way aesthetic works address us.  At the same
time, it gives new life to the idea that the aesthetic can help
to heal the social world, prompting richer and more nuanced
ways of understanding the familiar and directing us toward
untried possibilities.  In short, The Cultural Promise of the
Aesthetic is nothing less than groundbreaking.
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